PREFACE
A week, or even a day without a report on bombing in the news has become rare. As a consequence, detecting a threat before it causes harm is a prominent public interest. However, there is a frightening variety of threats of which one has to be aware: those that have already been encountered and further ones of which nobody except the initiator(s) may have the slightest idea. Consequently, a systematic approach is assumed to be helpful to identify carefully all explosives.
Weapons and any kind of bomb are obviously the most common form of threat. Most weapons are detectable by metal detectors, but the existence of ceramic knifes, for example, should be kept in mind in this context. Bombs include not only grenades, ordnance, mines and other ammunition but also improvised explosive devices which do not have any blue-print for their construction. Figure 1 shows the vast range of possibilities for designing a bomb and what it might contain in addition to the explosive and fuse. Even the range of possible explosives exceeds that which usually constitutes the military arsenal. In particular, peroxides not containing any nitric oxide, which is typical of many explosives particularly in the military environment, have very often played a tragic role (e.g., the London attack on 7 July 2005). One reason for the occurrence of such substances is the fact that they can be easily home-made with ingredients readily available in any chemist's shop. Therefore, while few chemicals find use as military explosives, these can be combined with platiscizers and other materials to create a plethora of formulations. Several explosives based on nitrogen are listed in Table 1 along with their abbreviations. High explosives consist of an intimate mixture of oxidant and reductant, either within a single molecule, such as nitroglycerin, pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), trinitrotoline (TNT), or triacetone triperoxide (TATP), or within an ionic solid, such as ammonium nitrate, when mixed with fuel oil. Mixtures of high explosives are frequently used. For example, Semtex is a blend of cyclomethylenetrinitramine (RDX) and PETN.
In theory the problem of mine detection should be the easiest one because, despite the fact that there are hundreds of mine types, only a few explosive types are used. However, many "high-tech" approaches have proven not totally satisfactory. (Because the explosives are often hermetically sealed in the mine, or because of other nitrogen-containing materials in the ground?). Figure 2 provides a useful overview, albeit non-exhaustive, of current Bulk and Trace explosive detection technologies of interest. The necessity to provide definitive "yes or no" answers about the presence of explosives has led to interest in using tools that offer chemical-specific identification of explosive materials. To this end, researchers have turned their attention to spectroscopic techniques. Spectrometry is predominantly a tool for characterizing chemical substances. Some techniques are widely used in laboratories: Fourier transform infrared (FTIR), nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). Others are already available for outdoor applications: Raman, laser-induced breakdown spectrometry (LIBS), γ-spectrometry; further ones are still in development, for example terahertz (THz) and nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR). This latter seems to be the most promising bulk chemical identification technique being developed for explosives detection. 
What are the theoretical advantages of NQR?
This technique can be compared to NMR, but the main difference is that a magnet is not required. Therefore the NQR technique is relatively inexpensive and more compact. In NQR, as in NMR, a radio-frequency pulse excites transitions between polarized nuclear spin states. However, unlike NMR, these polarized states are not created via an externally applied magnetic field, but rather they are a result of purely intramolecular electronic forces. Specifically, the nuclear quadrupole moment, which only arises in nuclei that are non-spherical (spin quantum number > 1/2), interacts with the electric field gradient from the molecule's electron cloud, forming non-degenerate spin orientations. Since nitrogen-14 is a quadrupole-active nucleus, this technique is feasible for explosives detection applications.
The selectivity of NQR is considerable since the electric field gradient depends exclusively on the sight-symmetry the nucleus finds itself in with respect to the valence electrons. Therefore, the exact resonance frequency is extremely dependent on molecular geometry and, thus, peaks can occur across a very wide range. Even chemically equivalent nuclei can have distinct peak positions due to crystal packing geometries. For instance, the three ring nitrogens in RDX show three distinct NQR frequencies corresponding to ν + , ν − and ν 0 transitions (about 100 kHz apart from each other).
The NQR frequency is insensitive to long range variations in composition, therefore it does not change in physical mixture of the explosive with other materials such as the plasticizers in plastic explosives. The NQR signal strength varies linearly with the amount of explosive present, and is independent of the explosive distribution within the detection volume.
The NQR method can provide automated detection of explosives types in configurations missed by the imaging x-ray method. Therefore combining NQR with existing x-ray systems can provide improved scope for the checkpoint detection of explosive threats.
If NQR is so good, why it is not used everywhere?
The main limitation is the signal-to-noise ratio, particularly with the interference that exists in a field environment, because of the fact that NQR polarization is much weaker than that from an external magnetic field. The distinctive signatures are there, but the sensitivity is so poor that the signatures are difficult to pull out of the noise. The typical NQR signal is weaker than the thermal noise in the detector circuit. External sources of radio frequency interference also make detection difficult. Fortunately, methods to coherently manipulate the NQR signal exist, and these methods can be used to increase the signal amplitude and reduce interference.
In addition the high selectivity is partly a disadvantage, as it is not easy to build a multichannel system necessary to cover a wide range of target substances. Also it is difficult to detect substances fully screened by metallic enclosures, etc. The Naval Research Laboratory in the USA and the Kaliningrad Institute in Russia are the most important research centres in this field. However, there are many other laboratories working to improve the sensitivity of 
